The threat from the illiberal left
Don’t
underestimate the danger of left-leaning identity politics
reprinted
courtesy Economist Magazine 9/4/21
Something has gone
very wrong with Western liberalism. At its heart classical liberalism believes
human progress is brought about by debate and reform. The best way to navigate
disruptive change in a divided world is through a universal commitment to
individual dignity, open markets and limited government. Yet a resurgent China
sneers at liberalism for being selfish, decadent and unstable. At home,
populists on the right and left rage at liberalism for its supposed elitism and
privilege.
Over the past 250 years
classical liberalism has helped bring about unparalleled progress. It will not
vanish in a puff of smoke. But it is undergoing a severe test, just as it did a
century ago when the cancers of Bolshevism and fascism began to eat away at
liberal Europe from within. It is time for liberals to understand what they are
up against and to fight back.
Nowhere is the fight
fiercer than in America, where this week the Supreme Court chose not to strike down a
draconian and bizarre anti-abortion law. The most dangerous threat in
liberalism’s spiritual home comes from the Trumpian right. Populists denigrate
liberal edifices such as science and the rule of law as façades for a plot by
the deep state against the people. They subordinate facts and reason to tribal
emotion. The enduring falsehood that the presidential election in 2020 was
stolen points to where such impulses lead. If people cannot settle their
differences using debate and trusted institutions, they resort to force.
The attack from the left
is harder to grasp, partly because in America “liberal” has come to include an
illiberal left. We describe this week how a new style of politics has recently
spread from elite university departments. As young graduates have taken jobs in
the upmarket media and in politics, business and education, they have brought
with them a horror of feeling “unsafe” and an agenda obsessed with a narrow
vision of obtaining justice for oppressed identity groups. They have also
brought along tactics to enforce ideological purity, by no-platforming their
enemies and cancelling allies who have transgressed—with echoes of the confessional state that dominated
Europe before classical liberalism took root at the end of the 18th century.
Superficially, the
illiberal left and classical liberals like The Economist want
many of the same things. Both believe that people should be able to flourish
whatever their sexuality or race. They share a suspicion of authority and
entrenched interests. They believe in the desirability of change.
However, classical
liberals and illiberal progressives could hardly disagree more over how to
bring these things about. For classical liberals, the precise direction of
progress is unknowable. It must be spontaneous and from the bottom up—and it
depends on the separation of powers, so that nobody nor any group is able to
exert lasting control. By contrast the illiberal left put their own power at
the centre of things, because they are sure real progress is possible only
after they have first seen to it that racial, sexual and other hierarchies are
dismantled.
This difference in method
has profound implications. Classical liberals believe in setting fair initial
conditions and letting events unfold through competition—by, say, eliminating
corporate monopolies, opening up guilds, radically reforming taxation and
making education accessible with vouchers. Progressives see laissez-faire as a
pretence which powerful vested interests use to preserve the status quo.
Instead, they believe in imposing “equity”—the outcomes that they deem just.
For example, Ibram X. Kendi, a scholar-activist, asserts that any colour-blind
policy, including the standardised testing of children, is racist if it ends up
increasing average racial differentials, however enlightened the intentions
behind it.
Mr Kendi is right to want
an anti-racist policy that works. But his blunderbuss approach risks denying
some disadvantaged children the help they need and others the chance to realise
their talents. Individuals, not just groups, must be treated fairly for society
to flourish. Besides, society has many goals. People worry about economic
growth, welfare, crime, the environment and national security, and policies
cannot be judged simply on whether they advance a particular group. Classical
liberals use debate to hash out priorities and trade-offs in a pluralist
society and then use elections to settle on a course. The illiberal left
believe that the marketplace of ideas is rigged just like all the others. What
masquerades as evidence and argument, they say, is really yet another assertion
of raw power by the elite.
Progressives of the old
school remain champions of free speech. But illiberal progressives think that
equity requires the field to be tilted against those who are privileged and
reactionary. That means restricting their freedom of speech, using a caste
system of victimhood in which those on top must defer to those with a greater
claim to restorative justice. It also involves making an example of supposed
reactionaries, by punishing them when they say something that is taken to make
someone who is less privileged feel unsafe. The results are calling-out, cancellation
and no-platforming.
Milton Friedman once said
that the “society that puts equality before freedom will end up with neither”.
He was right. Illiberal progressives think they have a blueprint for freeing
oppressed groups. In reality theirs is a formula for the oppression of
individuals—and, in that, it is not so very different from the plans of the
populist right. In their different ways both extremes put power before process,
ends before means and the interests of the group before the freedom of the individual.
Countries run by the
strongmen whom populists admire, such as Hungary under Viktor Orban and Russia
under Vladimir Putin, show that unchecked power is a bad foundation for good
government. Utopias like Cuba and Venezuela show that ends do not justify
means. And nowhere at all do individuals willingly conform to state-imposed
racial and economic stereotypes.
When populists put
partisanship before truth, they sabotage good government. When progressives
divide people into competing castes, they turn the nation against itself. Both
diminish institutions that resolve social conflict. Hence they often resort to
coercion, however much they like to talk about justice.
If classical liberalism
is so much better than the alternatives, why is it struggling around the world?
One reason is that populists and progressives feed off each other
pathologically. The hatred each camp feels for the other inflames its own
supporters—to the benefit of both. Criticising your own tribe’s excesses seems
like treachery. Under these conditions, liberal debate is starved of oxygen.
Just look at Britain, where politics in the past few years was consumed by the
rows between uncompromising Tory Brexiteers and the Labour Party under Jeremy
Corbyn.
Aspects of liberalism go
against the grain of human nature. It requires you to defend your opponents’
right to speak, even when you know they are wrong. You must be willing to
question your deepest beliefs. Businesses must not be sheltered from the gales
of creative destruction. Your loved ones must advance on merit alone, even if
all your instincts are to bend the rules for them. You must accept the victory
of your enemies at the ballot box, even if you think they will bring the
country to ruin.
In short, it is hard work
to be a genuine liberal. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, when their
last ideological challenger seemed to crumble, arrogant elites lost touch with
liberalism’s humility and self-doubt. They fell into the habit of believing
they were always right. They engineered America’s meritocracy to favour people
like them. After the financial crisis, they oversaw an economy that grew too
slowly for people to feel prosperous. Far from treating white working-class
critics with dignity, they sneered at their supposed lack of sophistication.
This complacency has let
opponents blame lasting imperfections on liberalism—and, because of the
treatment of race in America, to insist the whole country was rotten from the
start. In the face of persistent inequality and racism, classical liberals can
remind people that change takes time. But Washington is broken, China is
storming ahead and people are restless.
A liberal lack of conviction
The ultimate complacency
would be for classical liberals to underestimate the threat. Too many
right-leaning liberals are inclined to choose a shameless marriage of
convenience with populists. Too many left-leaning liberals focus on how they,
too, want social justice. They comfort themselves with the thought that the
most intolerant illiberalism belongs to a fringe. Don’t worry, they say,
intolerance is part of the mechanism of change: by focusing on injustice, they
shift the centre ground.
Yet it is precisely by
countering the forces propelling people to the extremes that classical liberals
prevent the extremes from strengthening. By applying liberal principles, they
help solve society’s many problems without anyone resorting to coercion. Only
liberals appreciate diversity in all its forms and understand how to make it a
strength. Only they can deal fairly with everything from education to planning
and foreign policy so as to release people’s creative energies. Classical
liberals must rediscover their fighting spirit. They should take on the bullies
and cancellers. Liberalism is still the best engine for equitable progress.
Liberals must have the courage to say so.
====================================================================
The illiberal left
How did
American “wokeness” jump from elite schools to everyday life?
And
how deep will its influence be?
WASHINGTON, DC
You could use a single word
as a proxy. “Latinx” is a gender-neutral adjective which only 4% of American
Hispanics say they prefer. Yet in 2018 the New York Times launched
a column dedicated to “Latinx communities”. It has crept into White House press releases
and a presidential speech. Google’s diversity reports use the even more
inclusive “Latinx+”.
A term once championed by esoteric academics has gone mainstream.
The espousal of new
vocabulary is one sign of a social mobilisation that is affecting ever more
areas of American life. It has penetrated politics and the press. Sometimes it
spills out into the streets, in demonstrations calling for the abolition of
police departments. It is starting to spread to schools. San Francisco’s
education board, which for more than a year was unable to get children into
classes, busied itself with stripping the names of Abraham Lincoln and George
Washington from its schools, and ridding department names of acronyms such
as vapa (Visual and
Performing Arts), on the ground that they are “a symptom of white supremacy”.
What links these
developments is a loose constellation of ideas that is changing the way that
mostly white, educated, left-leaning Americans view the world. This credo still
lacks a definitive name: it is variously known as left-liberal identity
politics, social-justice activism or, simply, wokeness. But it has a clear
common thread: a belief that any disparities between racial groups are evidence
of structural racism; that the norms of free speech, individualism and
universalism which pretend to be progressive are really camouflage for this
discrimination; and that injustice will persist until systems of language and
privilege are dismantled.
These notions were
incubated for years in the humanities departments of universities (elite ones
in particular), without serious challenge. Moral panics about campus culture
are hardly new, and the emergence of a new leftism in the early 2010s prompted
little concern. Even as students began scouring the words of academics,
administrators and fellow students for microaggressions, the oppressive slights
embedded in everyday speech, and found them, complacency ruled. When invited
speeches from people such as Christine Lagarde, then head of the International
Monetary Fund, were cancelled after student activists accused her of complicity
in “imperialist and patriarchal systems”, the response was a collective shrug.
The complacency was
naive. America harboured a “Vegas campus delusion”, says Greg Lukianoff,
president of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, an advocacy
group. “What happens on campus will not stay on campus.” It has not. The
influence of the new social-justice mindset is now being felt in the media, the
Democratic Party and, most recently, businesses and schools.
How did this breakout
happen? Three things helped prepare the ground: a disaffected student body, an
academic theory that was malleable enough to be shaped into a handbook for
political activism, and a pliant university administration.
First came a new
generation of students keenly aware of unsolved social problems and willing to
see old-fashioned precepts of academic freedom (such as open debate) as
obstacles to progress. Various events—the financial crisis, the election of
Donald Trump, the police killings of unarmed black men, especially that of
George Floyd—fed frustration with traditional liberalism’s seeming inability to
end long-run inequities. This hastened the adoption of an ideology that offered
fresh answers.
In a book entitled “The
Coddling of the American Mind”, Mr Lukianoff and a social psychologist,
Jonathan Haidt, posit that overprotective parenting in the shadow of the war on
terrorism and the great recession led to “safetyism”, a belief that safety,
including emotional safety, trumps all other practical and moral concerns. Its
bounds grew to require disinviting disfavoured campus speakers (see chart 1),
protesting about disagreeable readings and regulating the speech of fellow
students.
Many students latched
onto a body of theory which yokes obscurantist texts to calls for social action
(or “praxis”) that had been developing in the academy for decades. In 1965
Herbert Marcuse, a critical theorist, coined the phrase “repressive tolerance”,
the notion that freedom of speech should be withdrawn from the political right
in order to bring about progress, since the “cancellation of the liberal creed
of free and equal discussion” might be necessary to end oppression. Another
influence was Paulo Freire, a Brazilian educator whose “Pedagogy of the
Oppressed” (published in English in 1970) advocated a liberatory pedagogy in
the spirit of Mao’s Cultural Revolution in which “the oppressed unveil the
world of oppression and through the praxis commit themselves to its
transformation”.
The Great Awokening
Today the most prominent
evangelists for what political scientists such as Zachary Goldberg call the
Great Awokening are Ibram X. Kendi and Robin DiAngelo. Both these
scholar-activists have written bestselling books that sketch the expansive
boundaries of systemic racism. Both minimise the role of intent, but in
different ways. In Mr Kendi’s Manichaean worldview actions are either actively
narrowing racial gaps, and are therefore anti-racist, or they are not, in which
case they are racist. “Capitalism is essentially racist; racism is essentially
capitalist,” he concludes.
Ms DiAngelo is concerned
with the racism of everyday speech. For her, the intent of the oppressor is
immaterial if an oppressed person deems the conduct to be offensive. How “white
progressives cause more daily harm [to black people] than, say, white
nationalists” is the subject of her latest book, “Nice Racism”. She sees
liberal norms like individualism or the aspiration for colour-blind
universalism as naive: “Liberalism doesn’t account for power, and the
differential in power,” she says.
The embrace of this
ideology by students and professors might have remained inconsequential had it
not been for the part played by administrative staff. Since 2000, such staff in
the University of California system has more than doubled, outpacing the
increase in faculty and students. The growth in private universities has been
even faster. Between 1975 and 2005 the ranks of administrators grew by 66% in
public colleges but by 135% in private ones. As their headcount grew, so did
their remit—ferreting out not just overt racism or sexual harassment but
implicit bias too. The University of California, Los Angeles, now insists that
faculty applying for tenure include a diversity statement.
In 2018 Samuel Abrams, a
political scientist at Sarah Lawrence College, published data showing that
these administrators are even more left-leaning than the professors: liberals
outnumber conservatives by 12 to one. For writing about this, Mr Abrams faced a
campaign by outraged students aiming to revoke his tenure. Campaigns by a vocal
minority of activists have cast a pall on campus life, he says. “Large numbers
of people hate this. They just don’t know what to do,” he laments. “They don’t
want the mob coming to them.”
An upheaval in mass
communication accelerated the trend. On Twitter, a determined minority can be
amplified, and an uneasy centre-left can be cowed. “Weaponisation of social
media became part of the game. But what I think nobody foresaw was that these
tactics could so easily be imported to the New York Times or
Penguin Random House or Google,” says Niall Ferguson, a historian at Stanford’s
Hoover Institution. “The invasion…was just a case of the old problem: that
liberals defer to progressives. And progressives defer to outright
totalitarians.”
Mr Trump’s election added
to centrists’ unease, leaving the poles to grow ever more extreme. “Anything
but far-left progressivism was lumped in with Trump,” says one (Democratic)
prosecutor in San Francisco. In the protest against Mr Trump’s handling of the
Mexican border, for instance, the old Democratic line of enhanced border
security and a path to citizenship for the long-term undocumented became passé.
Progressives proved their sincerity by being in favour of abolishing
immigration authorities entirely.
Having grown strong
roots, social-justice consciousness has spread most readily to non-academic
institutions largely peopled by those who have come through elite universities.
As the students who have embraced this messy body of theory leave university,
they enter into jobs and positions of influence. The question is whether,
outside the ivory tower, the ideology will retain its intolerant and
belligerent zeal, or whether it will mellow into a benign urge for society to
be a little fairer.
Newspapers are a prime
example. The digital revolution has devastated local newspapers and crowned new
online-only champions. As newsrooms adapted by aping the upstarts, hacks who
had risen through the ranks thanks to shoe-leather reporting were replaced by
younger staffers stuffed with new ideas from elite universities. One prominent
journalist argued for replacing “neutral objectivity” with “moral
clarity”—making unflinching distinctions between right and wrong.
The urge to purge
Changes in newsrooms were
also related to efforts to increase demographic diversity, on the assumption
that this is the only authentic way to give voice to minorities. But the campus
zeal for deplatforming voices deemed offensive and defenestrating those found
guilty of violating the ethos has also been imported. (James Bennet, who
resigned as editorial-page editor of the New
York Times after one such row,
now works for The Economist; he was not involved in this article.) Non-journalists on
the staff of newspapers, including young engineers, can be even more activist
in campaigning against colleagues judged to be producing content at odds with
the new vision of social justice.
As with universities,
this stridency met little rebuke from the heads of newsrooms. Lee Fang, a
left-leaning journalist for “The Intercept”, an online publication specialising
in “adversarial journalism”, was accused by a colleague of racism for posting
an interview with an African-American supporter of Black Lives Matter who
offered a personal criticism of the group. He was made to apologise.
The quiet cultural
revolution has also affected the Democratic Party. A decade ago, around 40% of
white liberals agreed that “racial discrimination is the main reason why many
black people can’t get ahead these days”; today over 70% do (see chart 2). In
2013, according to Gallup, a pollster, 70% of Americans thought black-white
race relations were going well; that has dropped to 42%. Among white conservatives
and moderates, there has been little movement on such questions.
In the past decade a far
greater share of white liberals than African-Americans came to believe that
blacks should have “special favours” to get ahead (see chart 3). Ideas for
promoting racial equity that once belonged to the Democrats’ left fringe have
become mainstream. Cash reparations for African-Americans are supported by 49%
of Democrats, for example, and 41% endorse reducing police funding.
Democratic politicians
have responded. In 2008 Barack Obama criticised overheated sermons of his
pastor, saying “they expressed a profoundly distorted view of this country—a
view that sees white racism as endemic, and that elevates what is wrong with
America above all that we know is right with America.” The pastor’s view is now
ascendant among Democrats.
In 2016 Hillary Clinton
started giving speeches on the need to end systemic racism. By 2020 this
movement was the defining fault line of the presidential primary. Joe Biden, an
avatar for Democratic consensus, won by taking positions far to the left of Mr
Obama, including on matters of identity politics. That is why his
administration speaks much more social-justice patois than Mr Obama’s ever did.
And why it embraces reparations-adjacent policies like the creation of a $4bn
fund to pay off the debts of only non-white farmers, and a proposal that 40% of
benefits from climate-change investment go to previously disadvantaged
communities.
Wokers of the world, unite!
This new political
prominence makes the question of what happens to the ideology of social
activism as it spreads beyond the ivory tower all the more important. Does it
retain its purity and potency? Or does it become diluted?
The corporate world will
be a big test. Businesses, particularly those in the knowledge economy, have
been grappling with the challenge of how to respond to social-justice consciousness
as young employees agitate for change and woke consumers threaten boycotts.
An increasingly common
argument is that there is no trade-off between greater diversity and profits.
“I’d like to get to a place where we thought that diverse representation was
just as important as profitability, because we believed it was linked to so
many things that were going to come back and drive value,” says Julie Coffman,
the chief diversity officer of Bain & Company, a management consultancy.
Others make an explicit business case. McKinsey, another consultancy, has
released a stream of reports arguing that firms with greater ethnic and gender
diversity have a greater chance of financial outperformance.
Since Floyd’s murder,
American businesses have issued a dizzying number of equity-related missives
and quotas for hiring and procurement. Facebook, a social-media giant, has
promised to hire 30% more black people in leadership positions and has set a
goal that “50% of our workforce be from underrepresented communities by the end
of 2023”. Target, a retailer, has pledged to spend more than $2bn with
black-owned businesses by the end of 2025. Walmart, another retail titan, has
set up a Centre for Racial Equity and says it will give it $100m to “address
the drivers of systemic racism”.
Importing the language of
equity without university-style blow-ups can be difficult. “What you’re seeing
is Gen Z or young millennials basically engaging in this collective war against
the boomers and the Gen Xers who actually run the organisations,” says Antonio
García Martínez, whom Apple fired in May after 2,000 employees circulated a
petition questioning his hiring, citing passages they found to be misogynistic
in an autobiography published five years ago. When Brian Armstrong, the boss of
Coinbase, announced that workplace activism was to be discouraged, he was
inundated with private messages of admiration from ceos who felt that they
could not do the same—and public criticism.
“Corporate wokeism I
believe is the product of self-interest intermingled with the appearance of
pursuing social justice,” says Vivek Ramaswamy, a former biotechnology
executive and author of “Woke, Inc.”. He argues that Big Tech pursues corporate
wokeism because appearing to embrace social justice suits such firms’
commercial interests—both in terms of recruitment and appeal to their
customers. It performs allegiance to identity politics while simultaneously
rejecting the left’s critique of capitalism. “A lot of Big Tech has agreed to
bend to the progressive left,” he says, but “they effectively expect that the
new left look the other way when it comes to leaving their monopoly power.”
Such hypocrisy is
increasingly prevalent. The founder of Salesforce, a tech behemoth based in San
Francisco, is known for championing social-justice causes like a surtax to fund
homelessness services in the city. Yet the firm itself paid no federal taxes on
$2.6bn in profits in 2020.
Wokeness’s next frontier,
with the greatest potential to make a mark on the future, will be the classroom.
In California’s recently approved ethnic-studies curriculum, which may become a
high-school graduation requirement, one lesson plan aims to help students
“dispel the model-minority myth” (the idea that to dwell on Asian-American
success is wrong). Roughly one-sixth of the state’s proposed new maths
instruction framework is devoted to social justice. It approvingly quotes from
studies suggesting that word problems about boys and girls knitting scarves be
accompanied by a debate about gender norms. Last month the governor of Oregon
signed a bill eliminating high-school graduation requirements of proficiency in
reading, writing and maths until 2024—justified as necessary to promote equity
for non-white students.
Woker or weaker?
Such proposals hint at
the difficulties of translating some of the theories embraced by the new left
into policy. Because disparities are theorised to be the result of largely
implicit discrimination, systems must be dismantled. This leads to odd
conclusions: that racial test-score gaps in maths can be ameliorated by
dialectic; and that not testing for the ability to read is a worthy substitute
for teaching it. Material conditions that the old left cared about, such as
persistent segregation in poor districts and schools, get little attention.
There are some signs of a
backlash. Three members of San Francisco’s board of education, including its
president, are under threat of a recall election. So is the city’s
ultra-progressive district attorney. However, the underlying engine—the questionable
ideas of some academics, and the generational change they are rendering—is not
shutting off. America has not yet reached peak woke. ■
===============================================================
Sep 4th 2021 edition
Imposing orthodoxy
Left-wing
activists are using old tactics in a new assault on liberalism
It
is possible to detect eerie echoes of the confessional state of yore
Liberalism was forged in the revolt against the confessional state that
had ruled Europe for more than a millennium. In medieval Europe the Roman
Catholic church employed a transnational army of black-coated clerics who
demanded obedience on all matters spiritual and moral, and had a monopoly in
education. The Reformation introduced religious competition, strengthening the
confessional state. John Calvin crushed dissent in Geneva with imprisonment,
exile and execution. Henry VIII took to boiling dissenters alive. The Roman
church invented the Inquisition and the Index of Forbidden Books.
Liberalism started to
pick apart this fusion of church and state 350 years ago. John Milton wrote
that if the waters of truth “flow not in a perpetual progression they sicken
into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition”. Baruch Spinoza insisted that
scripture must be interpreted like any other book. David Hume and John Stuart
Mill argued that the best way to establish truth is by vigorous debate.
The fruit of this
thinking was plucked in three revolutions. In America’s, Thomas Jefferson
called “the loathsome combination of church and state” the root of most of the
world’s ills. The French also established a secular republic. The gradualist
English revolution left the Church of England intact but marginalised.
Yet something
extraordinary is happening in the West: a new generation of progressives is
reviving methods that uncannily resemble those of the confessional state, with
modern versions of loyalty oaths and blasphemy laws. And this effort is being
spearheaded in the heartland of Anglo-Saxon liberalism—often by people who call
themselves liberals. Here is how the old tactics are being revived.
Imposing orthodoxy. Today’s orthodoxy is sustained by an intellectual elite instead
of a spiritual one. Their natural home is the university. Some 70-80% of
right-leaning academics and doctoral students in Britain and America say that
their departments are hostile environments, according to Eric Kaufmann, of
Birkbeck College, London.
The progressive left is
even more dominant among students. There’s nothing new about left-wing student
revolts, but the protests of the 1960s were against the remnants of the
confessional state: radicals at Berkeley in California turned Sproul Plaza into
a free-speech zone, where anything could be said, and People’s Park into a
free-for-all zone, where anything could be done. Today’s radicals demand the
enforcement of codes of behaviour and speech. A poll of more than 4,000
four-year college students for the Knight Foundation in 2019 found that 68%
felt that students cannot say what they think because their classmates might
find it offensive.
Proselytising. Religious faiths have always had a vanguard, such as the Jesuit
order, who see it as their job to move the boundaries of belief and behaviour
towards righteousness. The vanguard of the woke revolution are young activists.
Belief in foundations of liberalism such as free speech declines with each
generation. The Pew Research Centre notes that 40% of millennials favour
suppressing, in various unspecified ways, speech deemed offensive to
minorities, compared with 27% among Gen Xers, 24% among baby-boomers and only
12% among the oldest cohorts.
Progressives replace the
liberal emphasis on tolerance and choice with a focus on compulsion and power.
As in many religions, righteous folk have a duty to challenge immorality
wherever they find it. They find a lot of it, believing that white people can
be guilty of racism even if they don’t consciously discriminate against others
on the basis of race, because they are beneficiaries of a system of
exploitation. Classical liberals conceded that your freedom to swing your fist
stops where my nose begins. Today’s progressives argue that your freedom to
express your opinions stops where my feelings begin.
Expelling heretics. The new confessional state enforces ideological conformity by
expelling heretics from their jobs, a practice that liberals shed much blood
trying to eradicate. In academia this is becoming wearily familiar.
In 2018 Colin Wright, a
post-doctoral student at Penn State University, wrote two articles arguing that
sex is a biological reality not a social construct, a statement that would once
have been uncontroversial. Critics posted a warning that “Colin Wright is a
Transphobe who supports Race Science” and sent emails to search committees
condemning him. Sympathetic academics told him privately that they could not
offer him a job as it was “too risky”.
Book banning. In Restoration England Oxford University burned the works of
Hobbes and Milton in the great quad next to the Bodleian Library. Today
academics put trigger warnings on books, alerting students to the dangers of
reading them. Young publishers try to get controversial books “cancelled”.
Though they have failed
on their highest-profile targets such as J.K. Rowling (publishers have to make
money), they are succeeding with lesser fry, creating an atmosphere in which
senior editors are less likely to bet on unknown authors with controversial
opinions. Alexandra Duncan, a white American, even cancelled her own book,
“Ember Days”, after writing from the point of view of a black woman, something
that is now dismissed as “cultural appropriation”.
Creeds. Churches demanded that people sign a statement of religious
beliefs, like the Anglican church’s 39 Articles, before they could hold civil
office. The University of California (uc) is doing something similar. Applicants for faculty posts have
to complete statements about how they will advance diversity and inclusion.
These are worthy goals.
But Abigail Thompson, until recently chair of maths at uc Davis and a
lifelong liberal, points out that uc’s scoring system rewards a woke view of how to realise them. In
2019 the life-sciences department at uc Berkeley rejected 76% of applicants on the basis of their
diversity statements without looking at their research records.
Blasphemy. Scotland, a cradle of the Enlightenment, abolished the crime of
blasphemy in March. At the same time, however, it reintroduced it by creating
new offences such as “stirring up hatred” and “abusive speech”—punishable by up
to seven years in prison.
The analogy with the past
has its limits: no one is getting burnt at the stake. But it is a useful
reminder that liberal values such as tolerance cannot be taken for granted.
They were the product of centuries of argument and effort. The liberal state is
still much younger today than the confessional state was when liberalism
replaced it.
reprinted
courtesy Economist Magazine 9/4/21